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ABSTRACT In 2002, Dan Moerman outlined three candidate explanations for 
the “placebo response”: the “conditioned stimulus-response,” Irving Kirsch’s “re-
sponse-expectancy” explanation, and the “meaning response.” The meaning response, 
Moerman argued, was the only one of the three candidate explanations that could 
cover all the data, gained from decades of RCTs and centuries of historical record. 
Moerman went so far as to propose replacing the term “placebo effect/response” with 
the term “meaning response,” because people are not responding to placebos, since 
there is nothing to respond to; people are responding to meanings. There is evidence 
of medically significant meaning responses where there is no evidence for condition-
ing. Similarly, there is evidence for such responses where those subject to them lack 
the knowledge—epistemic capital—required to form the beliefs which might consti-
tute an expectation. Something else, neither conditioning nor propositional attitudes, 
explained placebo responses, and Moerman proposed the meaning response. While 
the authors consider the meaning response to avoid the pitfalls of conditioning and 
response-expectancy, it has been subject to criticism. The criticisms have focused on 
what is seen as the explanation falling foul of the naturalistic demand and not fitting 
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with prevalent predilections in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. This 
article seeks to allay these worries and proposes the inclusion of ethnomethodological 
fieldwork in future research.
Is There a Phenomenon?
Is there a response, which is not accounted for by regression to the mean (statistical 
artefact), natural history (people recovering over time), the Hawthorne effect 
(subjects behaving a certain way because they are being observed)?
The term placebo comes to us from the Latin for “I shall please,” indicating that the phenomenon known as the “placebo effect” or “placebo response” 
has been familiar to medical practitioners for a number of centuries, at least. As 
we reached the mid-20th century and randomized controlled trials (RCTs) be-
came a central feature of medical research, the use of controls and blinding in 
those trials allowed for the isolation of the placebo effect in ways that made it 
much clearer that there was a phenomenon here which had significance, not only 
for the practice of medicine but also for understanding more generally the ways 
in which human beings meet and respond to the world. Well-conducted and 
designed RCTs, which include both “no treatment” and placebo controls, allow 
researchers to establish that what had historically been referred to as the “placebo 
effect” or “placebo response” was indeed a discrete medical phenomenon, one 
that wasn’t reducible to regression to the mean, nor explained away as patients 
misreporting their symptoms.
So, RCTs and their meta-analyses provided the data that afforded placebo 
researchers a kind of epistemic confidence and warrant for claiming the placebo 
effect to be a phenomenon worthy of scientific investigation. Nevertheless, this 
hasn’t prevented some from continuing to be placebo-skeptics and questioning 
whether there is a discrete phenomenon here. The go-to work for the skeptics is 
that published by Asbjorn Hróbjartsson and Peter Gøtzsche (2001, 2010). They 
conducted a systematic review of placebo-controlled RCTs: RCTs comprised 
of a placebo control, a no-treatment control, and a group receiving treatment. 
What their analysis seemed to show was that on average placebos produced out-
comes only a little better than the no treatment groups. Based on this average, 
the authors concluded that “placebo” was actually a mislabeled natural history 
effect: people often tend to recover naturally over time. Headaches go away over 
time, pain subsides, rashes tend to clear up, and so on: the natural history of many 
ailments is that they pass.
While Hróbjartsson and Gøtzsche’s work is largely rejected by placebo re-
searchers, it is included in the Cochrane Library and therefore exercises influence 
on wider discussion among medical professionals. However, as Jeremy Howick 
and colleagues at Oxford subjected Hróbjartsson and Gøtzsche’s work to scruti-
ny, they found that the conclusions that had been drawn were misleading (Ho-
wick 2016; Howick et al. 2013). When you apply the same methods of review to 
the same body of data, but this time comparing the “real” treatment group with 
the no-treatment group, you find that on average, across all the studies, the real 
treatment group fare little better than the no-treatment and the placebo groups. 
It transpired that the conclusions drawn by Hróbjartsson and Gøtzsche were ar-
tefacts of their rather crude method of analysis: the production of the mean based 
on averaging a diverse range of RCTs, where the diversity extended so far as the 
definitions of placebo, “no treatment,” and “real treatment.” Put another way, 
Hróbjartsson and Gøtzsche set about averaging a diverse range of RCTs without 
addressing and controlling for the diversity.
Let’s see if we can pump our intuitions a little around this issue by illustrating 
the problem with a hypothetical example. Let’s say we have a couple of statisti-
cians (commissioned perhaps by accountants for a commercial airline) who want 
to find out if you’ve more chance of living if you fall out of an aircraft with a 
parachute on, than without. Let’s call them Starel and Olliardy. Starel and Ol-
liardy take a whole host of studies that document people exiting an aircraft while 
it is in the air, with a view to producing a systematic review of those studies. 
Taking the studies as a whole and looking at the group who had parachutes and 
those who didn’t have parachutes, they count up the survivors from each group 
and divide that total by the total in each of the respective groups, thereby arriving 
at their mean average survival rate for the with and without parachute groups. 
Having done this, they compare the averages and find, to their surprise (and the 
gratitude of the accountants), that there is little benefit to wearing a parachute. 
What’s happened?
Well Starel and Olliardy haven’t compared like with like. Their systematic 
review contained some studies where the subjects were exiting the aircraft, with 
or without a parachute, into enemy territory in a war zone. They had others 
where the aircraft was at such a high altitude that those exiting the aircraft re-
quired breathing equipment or insulation if they were to have good chance of 
surviving, yet this wasn’t controlled for in their review. They had other studies 
that skewed their mean because while it was known that the batch of parachutes 
were faulty, our analysts hadn’t adjusted for this. To compound matters, Starel 
and Olliardy didn’t differentiate between deaths where ground impact was the 
proximate cause and deaths where other factors, such as a hostile natural envi-
ronment or the availability of medical attention, played a significant causal role in 
determining survival rates.
So what we wanted to know was whether parachutes save lives. But we didn’t 
obtain an answer to that question, because our reviewers, Starel and Olliardy, 
failed to be precise in asking the question and thus in their analysis of the data. 
The point is that there are many factors that impinge on survival rates for those 
exiting aircraft in the air, and only some of these are related to wearing a (func-
tioning) parachute. If your study does not factor in and control for these other 
factors, then it will tell you next to nothing useful about the life-saving benefits of 
parachute-wearing, other things being equal. This is the point of control design.
To return to Hróbjartsson and Gøtzsche, they made a similar error to that of 
our hypothetical systematic reviewers of parachutes, because just as some medical 
conditions are more susceptible to medical treatment than are others, so some 
medical conditions are more susceptible to placebo treatment than others. Sim-
ilarly, while some medical interventions work better than others, some placebo 
interventions work better than others too. Why this is so is the subject of our 
next section. Just as Starel and Olliardy’s work can be misinterpreted as showing 
that no parachute is basically as good as a parachute for those exiting aircraft at 
altitude, Hróbjartsson and Gøtzsche misinterpreted their own review as showing 
that no treatment at all (remaining on waiting lists) was almost as effective as the 
administering of a placebo. In the parachute case, our intuitions tell us something 
must have gone wrong, and on investigation we discover what it is. In the case 
of Hróbjartsson and Gøtzsche, intuitions are, perhaps, less likely to lead to scru-
tiny, though it transpired things had gone wrong. Here’s how Howick (2016) 
summarized the problem:
By lumping very different studies together it made the average effect mislead-
ing. The average colour of apples and oranges is brown, but unless they are rot-
ten, neither oranges nor apples are brown. Their review included treatments for 
the common cold, alcohol abuse, smoking, herpes, marital discord, Alzheimer’s 
disease, “undiagnosed ailments,” and many others. The placebos were equally 
heterogeneous. Besides sugar pills, the “placebos” in their study included relax-
ation (classified as a treatment in some of the studies and as a placebo in others), 
leisure reading, answering questions about hobbies, reading newspapers, favour-
ite foods, talking about daily events, football, vacation activities, books, movies, 
and television shows. Even if the average placebo effect (for any placebo for any 
disease) is quite small, some placebos for some things could be quite effective.
This raises two issues which interest us here, for the purposes of the present paper. 
First, it is interesting to surmise why, in the case of Hróbjartsson and Gøtzsche’s 
study, so many seemed so satisfied with the conclusion that they were invited 
to produce a review for the Cochrane Foundation, when the methods were 
quite straightforwardly flawed, as readily exposed by Howick and colleagues. 
We suggest that the answer points to the need for philosophical scrutiny. Hró-
bjartsson and Gøtzsche’s study seems intuitive to many, because it seems to sup-
port background materialist assumptions. Put another way, if one’s spontaneous 
philosophical commitments are unreflectively materialist, then Hróbjartsson and 
Gøtzsche’s conclusions will fit with those commitments, and this might mitigate 
against subjecting those conclusions to critical scrutiny. However, when it is 
found that almost the same conclusion follows for the medical intervention when 
the same systematic review of the same data is conducted, then that initial intu-
ition is challenged.
Second, Hróbjartsson and Gøtzsche’s work on placebo also trades on a some-
what liberal employment of the term, which seems to encompass things that 
might equally, if not more, appropriately be defined as either treatment or no 
treatment. For example, as Howick notes (see above) relaxation is defined as 
“placebo” in some of the studies under review, but as “treatment” in some of 
the others. Suffice to say, for present purposes, that this is a significant problem. 
“Placebo studies” as a program of enquiry needs to be clear about the phenom-
enon under study.
We’re reminded here of §308 of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investiga-
tions, in which he remarks to the effect that both behaviorism and cognitivism, as 
theories of mind, fail to give an adequate account of their use of the term process 
as they employ that term (Wittgenstein 2009). References to “mental process” 
remain systematically unclear, whether employed in attempts to build a theory 
of thought and action (cognitivism) or as part of claims to reject the explanatory 
worth and thereby eliminate “mental process” from explanations of thought and 
action (behaviorism). As Wittgenstein reminds us, whether you want to produce 
a theory of something in pursuit of explanation or you want to eliminate the 
same, you need to have a grasp of—you need to be able to provide an account 
of—the grammar for that which you are theorizing or eliminating.
Explaining the Phenomenon
What is “placebo”?
It seems, then, that we do have a phenomenon. That which has come to be 
known as the “placebo response” is a phenomenon worthy of investigation. 
Well-designed RCTs with appropriate controls demonstrate there is something 
there that cannot be explained away by reference to regression to the mean, 
natural history effects, patient reporting bias, and the Hawthorne effect. What is 
it? Is it part of a wider phenomenon to be explained, or is it a singular, discrete 
phenomenon? Well, let us begin with what we know: for a wide range of med-
ical conditions, the administering of a sham intervention—a biochemically inert 
dummy pill, or a sham surgical intervention—elicits medically significant recov-
ery or relief from symptoms, recovery or relief that cannot be explained away 
as instances of regression to the mean, natural history, or the Hawthorne effect. 
We know it is not something smuggled in, so it is something else. Furthermore, 
for many medical interventions, where a pharmacologically active or surgical 
intervention is made, we know that success rates are often only explainable by 
reference to more than the pharmacology or the surgery; put slightly differently, 
medical treatment cannot simply be reduced to biochemistry and surgery.
The “placebo response” (a term we ultimately want to forgo) is the measur-
able, observable, or felt improvement in health or behavior not attributable to 
a medication or invasive treatment that has been administered.1 Phrased another 
way: “the pills were inert; but taking a pill wasn’t inert, and the brand name 
wasn’t inert” (Moerman 2002, 19). We might add that “and where pills are not 
inert but have proven pharmacological efficacy, that efficacy is often enhanced in 
medically significant ways by the meaning specific social practices of pill-taking 
and administration have for those involved, in addition to the meaning and sym-
bolic status of the packaging design, brand name, and site of administration has 
for those taking the pill.”
For now, we’ll continue to use the term placebo, though we’ve already hinted 
that the phenomenon that is accessed via the observation of “placebo responses” 
goes beyond “placebos”; we’ll say more about this below. Let us look instead for 
the moment at the candidate explanations of placebo found in the literature. That 
which has traditionally been referred to as the “placebo effect/response” tends 
to be explained by appeal to two explanations: first, a conditioned response, which 
therefore has the character of a mechanism, a little like a reflex response, only one 
that emerges from conditioning (Ader 1988); or second, an expectancy response, 
which is therefore characterized on the model of belief and expectation—belief 
that “x” leads to expectation that “x,” triggering response “y” (Kirsch 1985). 
We’ll look at these in turn.
Conditioned Stimulus-Response
The locus classicus of the conditioned stimulus-response is Pavlov’s dogs. Here 
the conditioning is said to be comprised of a number of stages: patterned causal 
sensory stimuli (a) [sound of bell ringing when food appears], that are reliably as-
sociated over time with another distinct set of sensory stimuli (b) [taste and scent 
of food, satisfaction of appetite], which results in the development of a “trigger 
mechanism.” Once developed, this “mechanism” becomes operative in the pres-
ence of sensory impacts (a) [the ringing of the bell] but the absence of (b) [the 
food], leading to certain physiological responses hitherto associated with sensory 
stimuli (b), such as salivating, now being “triggered” solely by sensory stimulus/
stimuli (a).
This is, it seems to us, the dominant folk explanation of placebo responses, 
but it fails to stand up to scrutiny. As an explanation, its appeal can be traced to 
1Some researchers have proposed differentiating between the terms “placebo response” and “placebo 
effect” (see, for example, Blease, Bishop, and Kaptchuk 2017), such that the former is employed to 
encompass responses that might well be explained away as Hawthorne effects, regression to the mean, 
and so on, while “placebo effects” picks out the distinctive phenomenon. We do not operate with this 
distinction because (1) we don’t find it helpful; (2) it has not been widely adopted; (3) it doesn’t seem 
to have any relationship to the current grammar of either term; and (4) it begs the question somewhat 
in a research area where the precise nature of the phenomenon is still a matter of disagreement. 
a prevalent spontaneous philosophy, which leads simple mechanistic “explana-
tions” to gain currency. However, conditioning cannot explain placebo responses 
for three reasons, which become evident when surveying the data.
First, classical—Pavlovian—conditioning has been widely abandoned as a via-
ble theory, owing to a wealth of arguments that show that there is no such thing 
as Pavlovian conditioning as traditionally conceived and as it has taken hold in 
the folk imagination; rather, there is the learning and making of associations 
(Rescorla 1988). Second, there is an absence of evidence for the existence of a 
conditioning stage in many documented cases of placebo responses. Even if there 
were such a thing as the conditioning of popular psychological mythology, the 
necessary conditions for such conditioning in many cases of placebo responses 
just are not present. And third, problems arise due to the role of cultural variance: 
studies in which experimental subjects would be said to have been subject to 
the same conditioning (where there appears to be “evidence” of conditioning) 
produced significantly different outcomes when conducted on different groups 
from different cultures (see Moerman 2000). Put a different way, conditioning 
cannot account for the cultural indexicality/variance widely observed in studies 
of placebo responses because cultural differences often track different responses in 
people who might otherwise be said to have experienced the same conditioning 
or training (Moerman 2002).
Response-Expectancy
In the 1980s, Irving Kirsch proposed the response-expectancy explanation 
for placebo responses. This putatively explains placebos as responses to expec-
tations: for example, you expect to find it difficult to sleep having had a double 
espresso late at night, and your expectation is based on your beliefs that caffeine is 
a stimulant and that a double espresso gives you a strong dose of caffeine. Given 
this expectation, you do indeed suffer disrupted sleep. However, unbeknownst to 
you, your host last night had run out of your favored java blend and, in a bid to 
avoid the shame that would inevitably follow from such a social faux pas, elected 
to give you a Swiss water decaffeinated double espresso without informing you. 
So your poor sleep was a placebo response, caused by your expectation, which 
was based on your (false) belief that the coffee you consumed was caffeinated 
(Kirsch 1985, 1997; Kirsch and Weixel 1988). Here’s how Kirsch put it in 1997:
Response expectancy is the anticipation of one’s own automatic reactions to 
various situations and behaviors. For example, a person may expect to feel more 
alert after drinking a cup of coffee, to feel less pain after taking pain medica-
tion, to feel intoxicated after drinking alcoholic beverages, and so on. Expected 
outcomes of this sort are among the things we consider in choosing courses of 
action (e.g., deciding whether to drink a cup of coffee or take pain medication). 
(69)
While response-expectancy is probably the current dominant explanatory frame-
work employed in placebo studies, we have serious misgivings.
Response-expectancy logically implies the presence of beliefs with proposi-
tional content, or to put it another way, it presupposes belief that. The problem 
here is that placebo effects have been demonstrated time and time again to op-
erate where there is no evidence for such belief. This is not a point based simply 
on patients/responders being unable to articulate their belief that intervention X 
is effective, it is rather that studies have shown that those responding to a placebo 
often do not have the knowledge—the epistemic resources—required to form 
the belief as to the benefit of the relevant factor. Put more expansively, on the 
standard view of cognition, to expect something that is not present to one, one 
has to represent the putative state of affairs one is expecting. The problem is that 
in many documented cases of placebo responses there is simply no evidence that 
those responding to the sham intervention have such a propositional attitude (un-
like in the coffee example). However, and this is the more telling point, there are 
many cases of placebo responses where those responding to sham treatments in 
placebo-type ways do not have the epistemic resources, or even access to them, 
that might enable them to form the required belief. It is not merely that there are 
cases of placebo responses where those who respond do not appear to have the 
beliefs that would be required in order to form the expectation, it is that they 
don’t have access to the data required to serve as the building blocks for such an 
expectation.
Consider the following example: two Italian studies showed that when men 
and women are given blue or orange placebo sleeping tablets, the women fall 
asleep much more quickly than the men when given blue placebos, and the du-
ration of sleep is longer for women given blue placebos than it is for men (Cat-
taneo, Lucchelli, and Filippucci 1970; Lucchelli, Cattaneo, and Zattoni 1978). 
According to these studies, it would seem that in Italy, in the late 1960s and 
1970s, blue pills inhibited sleep in men, or promoted it in women, or both, at 
least compared to orange pills. In the absence of further anthropological and eth-
nographic data, one can do little more than surmise why this divergence in effects 
was evidenced in the trial. However, what is relevant to our discussion here is 
that there is no period in these experiments, or in Italian life, where people are 
trained to sleep (or not) with exposure to “unconditioned stimuli,” by taking 
blue tablets laced with barbiturates (for women), or with dextroamphetamine 
(for men). Indeed, we’d go so far as to suggest that it is distinctly unlikely that 
Italian women, in general, have grounds for believing that blue is a soporific color, 
while their male counterparts have grounds for believing the opposite. The ways 
in which the world has meaning for us cannot be reduced to belief that; meaning 
can emerge from associations and connotations, in addition to denotations. The 
response-expectancy explanation is constrained by being tied too closely to belief 
that, and therefore to propositionality.
How this might exercise constraint over research is illustrated by the discussion 
in a well-known, classic study of the placebo effects of branded over non-branded 
aspirin. Branthwaite and Cooper (1981) write:
In each group the standard 50-tablet canister of the analgesic was used. The 
outward appearances of the branded packs (groups B and D) were the same and 
were identical with those available over the counter in the United Kingdom. 
The brand tested is one of the most popular, non-soluble aspirin-based analge-
sics in the United Kingdom and has been widely available for many years and 
supported by extensive advertising. The unbranded, plain packs (groups A and 
C) were labelled “analgesic tablets” with the same instructions for use and tablet
contents as the standard branded pack. The tablets in the branded packs were
endorsed with the manufacturer’s design and those in the unbranded packs were
plain. The active ingredient in groups C and D was 325 mg aspirin per tablet;
the tablets in these two groups had the same formulation and in-vitro and in-vivo
release characteristics. Placebo and active tablets were the same size, shape, co-
lour, and weight, although they were not specifically matched for taste follow-
ing normal practice in trials with non-soluble products. (1576)
What interests us in this analysis is the following: when the analysis of the trial 
data is undertaken in the article, not only does the specific brand go without dis-
cussion (perhaps the authors weren’t allowed to name the brand), but so do the 
specifics of the branding. The authors do not discuss such things as the choice of 
brand name and its potential associations and connotations, nor do they discuss 
such things as the packaging design, color, and price, and the meaning that might 
emerge from that. Rather, in noting that the branding had effects on both previ-
ous users of the brand and non-users, they surmise that this might emerge from 
the brand’s general reputation. Unfortunately, we are not told if subjects who 
were non-users were familiar with the brand prior to the trial (something which 
would be crucial to any explanation). Branthwaite and Cooper continue:
Taking branded tablets, which people believe from past experience, hearsay, 
advertising, etc., are likely to relieve their headache, may divert attention from 
the headache or its sources, encourage a sense of wellbeing and coping, and 
therefore accelerate recovery. . . . Nevertheless, the branding was effective for 
non-users as well as users, which may suggest that the particular brand tested has 
a general reputation for efficacy. (1578, emphasis added)
Again, this is all based on what patients might have grounds for believing. And 
while the authors do discuss briefly the possibility that brand reputation might 
play a role, they do not discuss what might constitute that reputation, much less 
how “reputation” is itself not reducible to a set of beliefs. Our thought is that 
these oversights emerge because the authors operate exclusively within the para-
digm of expectation. The authors are looking for something in the brand that can 
be captured in the form of beliefs that might, in turn, constitute the expectation 
for those receiving the pills; in doing so, the authors overlook the role of meaning 
that does not take that form, the sort of meaning that might emerge from asso-
ciations the brand has, from connotations of the brand name, including the font, 
color, and other packaging design elements.
We can look at this from another perspective. While we might consider it 
likely that the subjects believe that aspirin will relieve their headache, it is, we 
propose, less likely that the same subjects believe that aspirin with the same com-
position, only packaged and named differently, will be more likely to relieve their 
headache or relieve it more quickly. Why would they believe this? Nevertheless, 
the meaning the branded aspirin has for them, in contrast to the non-branded 
one, will vary, owing to conative and associative factors. We do not seek to pur-
sue this point further here, rather we seek to make a plea for trials incorporating 
social researchers so that we might obtain the sort of data that enables better 
understanding. RCTs alone, without incorporating social researchers, leave too 
much to speculation.2
So, while in the case of the coffee example, the response-expectancy explana-
tion seems viable, because the example is one where belief seems to readily play 
an explanatory role, does it seem viable in the case of pill color or branding as 
drivers of the placebo response? We suggest not.
What of expectancy now? If we hold on to expectancy as an explanation for 
placebo responses, then we need to provide warrant for our having extended the 
grammar of “to expect,” such that it no longer entails an intentional object for 
the expectation, which gives the expectation its content. A modification of this 
kind would mean access to the relevant epistemic resources would no longer 
be an issue, which is important because—recall—they are simply unavailable in 
many cases of placebo responses. However, such a move would amount to a sig-
nificant extension to the grammar of “to expect” and its use, and would therefore 
find no support in current meaningful uses of the term.
We can put the argument of the last paragraph less abstractly: if you want to 
stick with expectancy, you owe us an explanation as to how someone can expect 
something while not being in a position to know or specify what it is they are 
expecting—in other words, how can one expect something or a state of affairs 
without being able to specify or represent the something or state of affairs that 
they are expecting? One might be tempted here to say, “Well, one can be in a 
state of expectancy, which is nonspecific or non-object-directed,” and we can 
concede that this is possible, though we suggest this would be better described 
as anticipation. However, such nonspecific, or contentless, expectancy (or antici-
pation) is not what is being appealed to in the response-expectancy explanation. 
2As will become clearer in the final section of this paper, we propose incorporating ethnomethodolog-
ically informed researchers in trials.
Nonspecific expectancy cannot be marshalled as a cause for a particular place-
bo response, because the response-expectancy explanation relies on the specific 
content of the expectation or expectancy being the very thing that generates the 
response. Put another way, for those who would defend the response-expectancy 
explanation, it is not merely being in a state of expectation that explains a placebo 
response, but the content of the expectation or expectancy. It is the object of the 
expectation—that which is expected—that does the lifting.
The Meaning Response
We might, therefore, go another way. We could leave the grammar of “to 
expect” as it is, stop trying to square this particular circle, and instead drop the 
overly restrictive reliance on response-expectancy as a global explanation for pla-
cebo responses. Then, as an alternative, we might talk more broadly about mean-
ing responses, and set about, via ethnographic investigations of people responding 
in medically significant ways to pharmacologically and surgically inert interven-
tions, the task of gaining a better understanding of medically significant meaning 
responses. Indeed, if we do so, we can forgo the preoccupation with the some-
what misleading term placebo, because medically significant meaning responses are 
present whether what is being administered is a dummy pill or a pharmacologi-
cally active pill, whether we are studying sham or dummy surgical interventions, 
or whether we are studying surgery. What has been referred to as the “placebo 
effect” or “placebo response” is but one manifestation of the meaning response, 
the manifestation that involves sham treatment. To conclude that what is signif-
icant or important is the nature of the sham part of the treatment is to miss what 
is genuinely worthy of investigation here: the role of meaning in medical practice 
and health.
We are not talking about the world having meaning in a way that demands 
we first have the resources to form beliefs about (possible) states of affairs in the 
world, for we don’t need to expect something to have a positive effect on our 
health us for us to be undergo a significant improvement in health when we have 
received a sham treatment. Rather, we move beyond such a representationalist 
picture of cognition, to more ecological (Costall 1995; Gibson 1986; Heft 1989), 
enactive (Ongaro and Ward 2017) or even ethnomethodologically informed ac-
counts (Garfinkel 1967).
How do we advance from this point? The two candidate explanations we have 
rejected share three things in common. First, both seek to provide a quasi-mech-
anistic explanation for placebo responses. In the tradition of a certain understand-
ing of what counts as a scientific explanation, these two candidate explanations 
seek to provide a general explanation that will cover all particular instances. Sec-
ond, they both reject any appeal to culture. They forgo any attempt to explain 
those people who respond to placebos in a way that might acknowledge and then 
unpack the role of enculturation in the constitution of the person-as-member-of-
a-social-order who responds in a medically significant way to the administration
of a sham intervention. Instead, they focus on behavioral conditioning (stim-
ulus-response explanations), innate capacities, or learning (response-expectancy
explanations). Finally, both explanations, in taking placebo responses as their sub-
ject, run the risk of allowing their investigations to be framed and constrained
by the administration of dummy pills and sham surgery and seek to explain this,
when this is just one small part of the wider phenomenon of the medically sig-
nificant role the meaning of social practices, social settings, packaging design, and
branding play in medical treatment. The ways in which human beings, as mem-
bers of social orders, come to meet, engage in, and even modify their world can-
not be reduced to innate characteristics, conditioning, and learning. That which
we gesture at when we talk of culture and enculturation needs to be included
and explicated.
In the case of placebos, on the one hand we know that the intended “inter-
vention” is sham—the pill is a dummy pill, and the surgical intervention is a 
mocked-up “intervention”—and this gives us one condition for something being 
a placebo. On the other hand, we have seen that explaining what is generating 
the response here via appeals to conditioning or expectation doesn’t work. The 
explanation is not that people are responding because they are conditioned to 
do so, in a manner that depicts those people as akin to functional artefacts, such 
as smoke detectors (where the conditioning of the person plays the role of the 
design of the artefact). Nor is it to be explained in all cases by claiming people 
are responding to their expectations, in a manner that depicts those people as 
data-processing devices. Instead, we propose that what has been referred to as 
the “placebo response” is actually a type of meaning response. Moreover, when 
we talk of meaning response, we are cognizant that responders are human beings 
who are members of a society, and who have gone through processes of encul-
turation. People respond to the meaning that complex social practices have for 
them, where those practices involve them as co-participants and co-producers of 
the order one finds therein, and they do so by virtue of their enculturation.
Where does this leave us? Response-expectancy is an explanation that invokes 
representationalist accounts of cognition, but which fails in its own terms. Our 
criticism shows that response-expectancy demands propositional content that is 
often simply unavailable. Moreover, our criticism goes deeper, questioning the 
representationalist paradigm within which response-expectancy operates. Re-
cently, non-representationalist approaches to cognition have reemerged or risen 
to prominence. In seeking to explain the medically significant meaning response, 
we propose one needs to look to these non-representationalist alternatives, es-
pecially radical enactivism (Hutto and Myin 2013, 2017), ecological psychology 
(Chemero 2009; Costall 1995; Gibson 1986; Heft 1988), and our favored ap-
proach, ethnomethodology (Coulter 1991; Garfinkel 1967). We will discuss the 
ethnomethodological approach in the penultimate section of this paper.
Losing the Phenomenon
Being in thrall to a specific form of explanation . . .
We propose that the first two of our candidate explanations of placebo responses, 
conditioning and expectancy, result in the loss of the phenomenon.
The first two, related, reasons for this, we suggest, are because (1) there is 
a background assumption that only certain forms of explanation are scientifi-
cally respectable, if one is to meet the naturalistic demand; and (2) the (already 
mentioned) commitment to representationalist conceptions of cognition set-off 
investigations on dead-end routes. These assumptions and commitments impose 
constraints on candidate explanations because they serve to a priori restrict what 
is to count as an acceptable explanation. Non-adhering forms of explanation, 
which reject those assumptions and commitments, are thus treated as “scien-
tifically” disreputable or as failing to meet the representationalist demand that 
cognition is necessarily representational.
These constraints can serve to prevent researchers from looking beyond innate 
characteristics of the species, behavioral conditioning, and proactive learning. 
We should like to suggest that it is exactly what falls outside the space of innate 
characteristics, behavioral conditioning, and proactive learning that is central to 
understanding placebo and meaning responses. We will say more about this in 
the next section, but what we’re interested in is what generally goes by the name 
of “culture”: the norms, rules, and situated forms of practice that give order to 
social settings and render them intelligible or accountable—in other words, for 
which it is possible to produce accounts—as social settings (as opposed to their 
being reducible to concatenations of random acts of individuals).
In addition to the “unrefined naturalist” and the “representationalist” con-
straints, we suggest that there is another problem, a problem that arises from mis-
identifying the true phenomenon in need of explanation. When investigating the 
phenomenon of people responding in medically significant ways to dummy pills 
or sham surgery, one can quickly become drawn into considerations of a much 
larger domain of phenomena that are significant for understanding medical prac-
tice more broadly. To allow one’s focus to remain fixed on the administering of 
dummy pills and sham surgery is akin to trying to understand a duck by focusing 
only on that part of the duck that is above water. For sure, the placebo controls 
in RCTs allow us to isolate and therefore throw into sharp relief the meaning 
response, by allowing us to control for it and differentiate medically significant 
meaning responses to the administration of dummy pills or sham surgery from re-
gression to the mean, Hawthorne effects, natural history effects, and so on. How-
ever, we should not confuse our ability to isolate the meaning response in this 
way with the nature of the phenomenon: there is much more to the phenome-
non than responses to dummy pills and sham surgery. In order to understand the 
nature of the meaning response, we will need to broaden our investigation and 
methods beyond RCTs, fMRI scans, and theories of expectation/expectancy.
Finding the Phenomenon
EM fieldwork: social practices, members, and the co-production of social settings
As our argument has unfolded, we have gestured at enculturation and culture 
as relevant to any adequate understanding of the meaning response and how it 
figures in producing what have historically been referred to as “placebo respons-
es.” It might be tempting, therefore, to invoke culture—sets of social norms, 
rules, and practices—as an explanatorily primitive category and perhaps propose a 
“culture model” or “meaning model.” However, learning from the ethnometh-
odologists, we recommend resisting such a temptation (Button 1991; Garfinkel 
1967; Garfinkel and Rawls 2002; Heritage 1991). For, as Harold Garfinkel has 
demonstrated, culture is not the primitive explanation for the orderliness of so-
cial action, but rather the (co-)product of social action, which is engaged in by 
members of a society who have gone through processes of enculturation: learning 
a language, exposure to narratives, and learning to see patterns, order, and signif-
icance in behavior, symbols, and institutions. Garfinkel’s insights emerged from 
studies in which he, his colleagues, and his students created scenarios in which 
they might observe social action in situations in which shared cultural norms, 
rules, and familiar forms of conduct were absent or destabilized. What is observed 
in such cases is that co-participants create, repair, and maintain social order and 
the social setting in situ, by drawing on endogenous—in other words, internally 
produced or self-furnishing—resources: they draw on their enculturation in situ 
and do so in a methodic manner that serves to frame the purposive or intentional 
actions undertaken in the same scenarios. Consider, for example, a conversation. 
The parties to a conversation make intentional or purposive contributions to that 
conversation, but the background against which they do so—the conditions that 
make this a conversational setting in which they can make those purposive con-
tributions—is also generated, maintained, and, if required, repaired by those same 
participants (as members of the social order) through their methodic actions. 
What goes for conversation, goes for drug administering, clinical encounters such 
as a visit to the physician, and so on. These settings involve purposive and inten-
tional action undertaken against a background, or in a setting, furnished through 
the methodic action of the participants.
Observing the role of methodic action helps us see that invoking culture as 
the primitive explanation or condition for social order, or the existence of social 
facts, is to misrepresent matters. Ethnomethodological studies show that culture is 
better understood as the product of members’ methodic actions and interactions, 
which provide the framework in which purposive or intentional action and in-
teraction can take place.3 Individuals are members of social orders, having passed 
through processes of enculturation, or as Aristotle would have put it, having been 
endowed with a second nature (in addition to their purely biological nature).
Let us be clear about what we are not arguing here. We are not arguing that 
there is no culture or process of enculturation, and that there are only individuals 
and their spontaneously produced actions. The point is rather that explanatory 
appeals to culture (or norms, social structure, or social facts) are not appeals to 
some primitive ontological entity or entities that are constitutively independent 
of the action, co-action, and interaction of members of social orders, but which 
serve as a condition for the order we find in social settings. Rather, the point 
is that the “order” in “social order” is to be found by observing the methodic 
actions of members of that social order in their interactions with each other and 
by representing these actions in concepts available to the members. This endog-
enously produced order is what makes social settings more than merely the sum 
or concatenation of spontaneously produced, ahistorical, and acultural individual 
acts. Culture is seen through, observed in, and lives as the methods used by mem-
bers of social orders in social settings extended over time.
That which is usually referred to as “culture” is not reducible to the products 
of learning, nor is it reducible to conditioning. There is something else. Some 
of this comes from becoming proficient in language(s), the sorts of conceptual 
horizons that are established, and the cognitive penetration enabled by doing so, 
and how this is integrated into the shared practices that anthropologists and eth-
nographers study. Some of it comes from acting in and on the world, and how 
this shapes us, as studied by enactivists. And some of this comes from institutional 
constraints and enabling conditions. This is what we gesture at when we talk 
of “enculturation.” Moreover, we gain access to these things and we demon-
strate their presence as constraints or as enabling conditions (social norms and 
rules), not through social theorizing, but through observing members of societies 
co-producing, repairing, maintaining, and challenging these constraints and en-
abling conditions in their interactions.
This insight into the “place” of culture and the role of ethno-methods in its 
forming provides us with guidance in the work we must do if we are to under-
stand the relationship between meaning and culture. If, as we are proposing and 
as the data suggests, the meaning a social practice has for a subject can generate 
medically significant responses, then we need to do more than simply appeal to 
culture to explain this. Culture is produced, repaired, and maintained, formed 
and reformed, and is observable through the methodic meaningful actions and 
interactions of members of society.
3There are illuminating parallels here with Wittgenstein’s remarks at §§241–242 of his Philosophical 
Investigations. This has been fruitfully explored in writings over a period of 40 years by the “Manchester 
Ethnomethodologists,” including Wes Sharrock and Jeff Coulter, along with various coauthors.
For example, the logic of—or the order one finds in—traffic flow is produced 
by the methodic action and interaction of drivers, but it is not reducible to their 
intentional actions, any more than it is to traffic laws and road signs. The logic of 
institutions is produced by the methodic action and interaction of the members 
who inhabit them—how they enact the rules and regulations, how they inherit, 
understand, and enact the purpose of the institution and negotiate the interplay 
between this and their own purposes, and so on—but it is not reducible to nor 
explained by the intentional actions of members, nor by the institutional rules 
and regulations.
What we propose is this: the logic of the meaning response—the way in which 
people respond in medically significant ways to meaning—is, we suggest, co-pro-
duced by the (non-intentional) methodic actions of participants in medical set-
tings, including drug trials. It cannot be reduced to the intentional actions and 
expectations of those same participants.
To conclude this section, we might put things in the following way: those 
who are responsive in medically significant ways to the meaning found in so-
cial settings such as the clinical encounter (in which drugs are administered, or 
surgery is conducted) and are so in ways that cannot be reduced to a response 
to the pharmacology of the drug or to the cuts of the surgeon’s scalpel, are also 
enculturated members of society. As such, they both inherit that society’s cultural 
traditions and draw upon them as they interact with others, in a way that results 
in the co-production, maintenance, and repair of the order (or logic) that is both 
constitutive of the social setting of which they are part and that renders that set-
ting as something for which we can provide an account. What it also does is serve 
to potentially differentiate that clinical social setting from other clinical social 
settings that are in other ways ostensibly the same: how we identify the cultural 
differences. What we propose is required, if we are to make progress in under-
standing meaning responses (and therefore understand what has historically been 
referred to as the placebo response), is the conducting of ethnomethodological 
fieldwork in placebo controls in medical trials. We currently have many neuro-
scientific studies of placebo controls, based on producing and analyzing fMRI 
scans. What we propose is to add ethnomethodological fieldwork studies, so that 
we might start to build a picture of the logic of meaning responses.
Concluding Thoughts
In summary, pace Hróbjartsson and Gøtzsche and those persuaded by them, there 
is a phenomenon here in need of explanation. A significant percentage of people 
respond in medically significant ways, under certain conditions, and these re-
sponses cannot be explained away as mislabelled natural history effects, regression 
to the mean, or the Hawthorne effect. 
The candidate explanations for this phenomenon that appeal to classical condi-
tioning and expectancy face significant difficulties. Were one inclined to operate 
with a Lakatosian framework, one would, we suggest, be forced to declare both 
the stimulus-response and response-expectancy research programs degenerative, 
and terminally so. Another research program is required, and we propose the 
meaning response provides the framework that might best guide that program.
The spontaneous philosophy that we argue underpins the appeal of both stim-
ulus-response and response-expectancy explanations is motivated by an unrefined 
naturalism, in which explanations are accepted as meeting the naturalistic demand 
only inasmuch as they ape explanations found in currently well-established nat-
ural science disciplines. We instead work with an understanding of the adequacy 
of explanation that is domain-specific and builds up from an understanding of 
the nature of the phenomena. Unrefined naturalism leads to a loss of the phe-
nomenon, and in the present context, it leads one to mistake a token instance of 
the phenomenon (the human capacity to respond in medically significant ways 
when pharmacologically inert pills and sham surgery are administered) with the 
phenomenon itself (the human capacity to respond in medically significant ways 
to the meaning certain social practices have for them).
We therefore propose that ethnomethodologically informed fieldwork be in-
corporated in order to direct us to the endogenous methods employed by mem-
bers of societies in the co-production of the order and meaning of clinical settings, 
thereby exhibiting the role meaning has in the efficacy of medical practice. In this 
way, significant ground can be made in understanding the phenomenon current-
ly referred to as “placebo.”
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